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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
VAL TAYLOR, 
Respondent, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 
1105~ 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Val Taylor, appeals from a con-
viction of the crime of contributing to or becoming 
responsible for the neglect or delinquency of a 
child, in violation of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
55-10-800) (Supp. 1967). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried without a jury in the 
Second District Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for the crime charged in the complaint. 
The Honorable John Farr Larson found appellant 
guilty and imposed sentence on the appellant of 
confinement in the county jail for a term of six 
months. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of 
the Second District Juvenile Court should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the fol-
lowing statement of facts as being more in keep-
ing with the rule that evidence will be reviewed on 
appeal in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. 
On or about February 9, 1967, appellant led his 
two stepdaughters, Shana and Christine Sleater, 
into the bathroom of the family home, removed 
their clothing, and proceeded to wash their pubic 
areas with a washcloth (T. 8, 23). Appellant then took 
the children into the master bedroom (T. 14) and 
told the children to get on the bed (T. 23). Appellant 
was nude at this time (T. 24). Appellant then had 
both children commit an act of fellatio (T. 8, 24) re-
ferred to in the record as "oral sodomy." There is 
also direct evidence of appellant committing cur.-
nilingus on the children (T. 8, 24). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE JUVENILE COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
SINCE THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE OF THE OF-
FENSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
---
~ 
.j 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
not granting his motion to dismiss on the failure of 
the state to prove the exact time of the offense in 
question. Respondent submits that Utah statutes do 
not require the exact time to be shown unless re-
quired to charge the offense and that the case law 
requires only that the offense occurred within the 
statute of limitations and before indictment. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-21-12 (1953) provides: (1) an 
information or indictment need contain no allega-
tion of the time of the commission of the offense 
unless such allegation is necessary to charge the of-
fense under Section 77-21-8. (2) The allegation in an 
information or an indictment that the defendant 
committed the offense shall in all cases be consid-
ered an allegation that the offense was committed 
after it became an offense and before the filing of 
the information or indictment, and within the period 
of limitations prescribed by law for the prosecution 
of the offense. (3) All allegations of the information, 
indictment and all bills of particular shall, unless 
stated otherwise, be deemed to refer to the same 
time. 
The Complaint herein states that the offense 
occurred "on or about the 9th day of February 
1967." The general rule is that the State is not bound 
by the allegation of "on or about" in an indictment 
as to the date of the commission of an offense, but 
may rely on anv date within the period of limita-
tions. Ellis v. State, 318 S.W.2d 655 (Texas 1958). In 
crimes involving sexual offenses, time is not a neces-
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sary element, and the State may elect to prove any 
such offenses which occurred prior to the filing of 
complaint and against which the statutes of limita-
tion has not run. State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 
P.2d 173 (1943). citing State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 
146 Pac. 306 (1915). 
The allegation of time of the commission of an 
offense is immaterial and regardless of the time al-
leged, except where made certain by a bill of par-
ticulars, the State may prove the offense at any time 
within the period of limitations. State v. Cox, 106 
Utah 253, 147 P.2d 858 (1944). 
The fact that these proceedings occurred in 
juvenile court do not affect the outcome of the case. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 55-10-81 (1963) provides: 
In proceedings in adult cases the practice and pro-
cedure of the juvenile court shall conform to the 
practice and procedure provided by law or rule of 
court for criminal proceedings in the district court 
except that the proceedings may be commenced 
by complaint and a jury shall consist of four jurors. 
The statute of limitations applicable to the offense 
here charged permits the prosecution and convic-
tion of a person for such an offense when committed 
within a perbd of two years anterior to the present-
ment of the information and complaint. Utah Code 
Ann. ~ 77-9-6 (1953). 
There was sufficient evidence before the trial 
court t8 show that the offense in question occurred 
within a six week period prior to February 12, 1967. 
I 
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I The respondent would, therefore, submit that the Juvenile Court was correct in not granting defend-
ant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to 
prove the commission on the exact date. 
POINT II. EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN CONVICTION. 
The appellant contends that the trial court com-
mitted error in allowing Shana and Christine Sleater 
to testify. At the time of the testimony Shana was 
seven years old and Christine was six years old. 
Prior to their testimony the deputy county attorney 
interrogated both witnesses in the presence of the 
court and the appellant's counsel. They indicated 
where they lived, acknowledged they were attend-
ing school, and gave the names of their brothers 
and sisters. They further indicated they knew what 
it was to tell the truth and knew what happened if 
thev told a lie. They acknowledged that they knew 
it was bad not to tell the truth and that they intended 
to tell the truth. They undersood that if they testi-
fied falsely they would be punished. No objection 
was made at any time to the testimony of either 
Shana or Christine Sleater. 
The appellant's position ]s that the trial court 
did not examine the children to ascertain whether 
they were capable of receiving correct impressions 
and therefore able to relay facts accurately. It is 
submitted that the appellant's position is without 
merit. 
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The appellant is m no position to challenge the 
court's action since no objection was raised at the 
time of trial. It is the general rule that a person chal-
lenging the competency of a witness must object 
prior to the time the witness is sworn or at least as 
soon as the incompetency of the witness is discov-
ered. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice. 4th ed., § 268. 
If the appellant felt the trial court had acted improp-
erly in allowing the girls to testify, it was incumbent 
to raise the objection at the time of trial. The failure 
to impose any objection indicates a waiver on the 
part of the appellant and further tends to support 
the conclusion that those who saw the witnesses 
and heard the responses to the questions put to 
them felt that there was no question as to the chil-
dren's competency. 
It is well settled in Utah law the questions of 
competency of an infant witness is one within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and this court will 
not overrule the trial court's decision in the absence 
of a clear showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Blythe. 20 l Ttah 378, 58 Pac. 1108 
(1899); State v. Morasco. 42 Utah 5, 128 Pac. 571 (1912); 
State v. McMillan. 46 Utah 19, 145 Pac. 833 (1915); 
State v. Zeezich. 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927 (1922); State 
v. Williams. 111 Utah 379. 180 P.2d 551 (1947). 
The testimony of a six-year old child is not ren-
dered completely incompetent nor entirely dis-
credited solely because of her age. As this court has 
previously observed, no particular age nor any spe-
cific stanclard of mental ability can be set as the 
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qualification for g1vmg testimony, but it is an im-
porta_nt factor to be considered, along with others, 
in determinating whether she should be allowed to 
testify. What is essential is that it appears that the 
child has sufficient intelligence and maturity that 
she is able to understand the questions put to her; 
that she has some knowledge of the subject under 
inquiry and the facts involved therein; that she is 
able to remember what happened; and that she has 
a sense of moral duty to tell the truth. Whether she 
meets these tests and is therefore a competent wit-
ness is within the sound discretion of the trial court 
to determine. That ruling will not be disturbed in 
the absence of a clear showing of abuse. State v. 
Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
The Utah State Supreme Court will presume 
neither error nor prejudice and the burden 
of so show in g is on the defendant who 
seeks to upset the judgment of conviction. 
State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966). 
The reviewing court is required to analyze evidence 
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in light most favorable to judgment. State v. Knep-
per, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). The com-
petency of a six and one-half year old prosecuting 
witness to testify in a prosecution for committing 
lascivious acts upon a child was a question for the 
determination of the trial court in the exercise of a 
sound discretion. The trial court's determination 
would not be disturbed in the absence of a showing 
of an abuse of such discretion. People v. O'Connor, 
44 C.A.2d 301, 112 P.2d 279 (1941). 
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POINT III. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT 
TO RECALL PROSECUTION WITNESSES FOR FUR-
THER EXAMINATION. 
Appellant contends inconsistency in the testi-
mony of the grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Hedberg; 
the children's mother, Carolyn Taylor; and the testi-
mony of the children themselves. As appellant has 
stated, it is left to the discretion of the trial court to 
allow the recalling of witnesses for further exam· 
ination. As this court has pointed out on numerous 
occasions, the extent to which redirect examination 
may be permitted rests largely in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court and unless abuse of discretion 
can be shown in admitting or excluding testimony, 
the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed on 
appeal. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 
(1949). 
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Baca, 
102 Ariz. 83, 425 P.2d 108 (1967) held that the trial 
court has large discretionary power in the control 
of cross-examination and, in order to find error, the 
reviewing court must find that the trial court has 
abused that discretion. 
The respondent therefore urges that there is 
not such an· inconsistency in the testimony of the 
prosecuting witnesses or their mother to require 
further grueling cross-examination of the two chil-
dren. The children testified as to the acts and as to 
the time of these acts. Since the appellant did not take 
the stand, pursuant to his constitutional right to do 
